We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer. We are grateful to R. Cautain for programming the experiment and to Q. Thévenet and Z. Dai for valuable research assistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several examples from real settings, like Enron and WorldCom, show that there can be an spread of deception that sometimes permeates the organizational culture (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Greve et al. 2010; Cohn et al., 2014) . Would more transparency have prevented this? In this paper, we study deception under scrutiny. Our intuition is that individuals will be less inclined to deceive others when their actions are more observable to other people that also have a stake in the outcome. First, we suspect that many individuals care about their social image and want to appear honest towards others. Second, observers may be in a position to reveal deceptive actions to others. This reduces the succesfullness of lies, and magnifies social image concerns, as more people will find out about the dishonesty of a person. On the other hand, the observers often have a stake themselves in deceiving a third party, and the monetary gains may outweigh the social image concerns.
Recently, the economic literature on deception has developed considerably, identifying motivations behind lying (Wang et al., 2010; Gneezy, 2005; Hao and Houser, 2011; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Ariely, 2012; Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013; Gibson et al., 2013; Charness et al., 2014) . In particular, this literature has identified the importance of both lie aversion (Vanberg, 2008; Lundquist et al., 2009) and guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Ellingsen et al., 2009 Ellingsen et al., , 2010 , and the importance of the maintenance of the self-concept of honesty (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009) . Some studies report on dishonest behavior when there is some form of monitoring and/or punishment, and therefore a degree of observability (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Belot and Schroder, 2013; Reuben and Stephenson, 2013) , or in front of an audience (Belot et al., 2009) . We are specifically interested in situations where the observers have a stake in the outcome. Such situations are common and relevant for many organizations. The impact of scrutiny on lying behavior in such a context has remained largely unexplored. participants will lie less. We speculate that senders delegate the decision to the observers, which they can only do by sending a false message.
We were especially surprised to find that senders were insensitive to their identity being revealed to observers. One reason could be that some senders are misleading receivers in another way, by strategically telling the truth when they expect the message not to be followed (Sutter, 2009) . Another reason could be that they do not care about being identified, because their monetary incentives are aligned with the observer. In Experiment 2 we test the robustness of our findings. We ran two additional Exposure treatments, this time with ten instead of two possible options. This design (inspired by Erat and Gneezy, 2012) eliminates strategic truthtelling. In one of the treatments, we also introduced a conflict of interest between the sender and the observer. We find that the proportion of advantageous lies is higher than in the original Exposure treatment, but strikingly find that this proportion is the same when interests are aligned and misaligned, showing no evidence of shame or guilt aversion. Overall, our findings suggest that higher scrutiny has little impact on dishonesty when the social cost of lying is limited, and transparency policies are not always a remedy against dishonesty.
II. EXPERIMENT 1

Design and Treatments
We use Gneezy's (2005) deception game and add a third player. In each treatment we form groups of three participants: a sender, an observer and a receiver. The game involves two possible payoff allocations. In the Baseline treatment, one allocation yields a payoff of €5 to the sender, €6 to the observer and €15 to the receiver. The other allocation yields a payoff of €15 to the sender, €7 to the observer and €4 to the receiver. Note that the sender's and observer's payoffs are aligned. The receiver is unaware of any of the payoffs. The sender and the observer learn which allocation is labeled option X and which one is labeled option Y.
The sender has to send one of two possible messages to the receiver: "Option X earns you more than option Y" or "Option Y earns you more than option X". The observer can see the sender's message and this is common knowledge. After receiving the message, the receiver has to choose between options X and Y, knowing that both the sender and the observer know the details of the payoff allocation options. The choice determines which allocation is implemented. Participants played the game only once.
The Exposure treatment is identical to the Baseline, except that senders have to stand up one by one before choosing a message. Each observer can identify the sender in his group, but not the other way around. In the Chat treatment, the observer and the sender can chat freely with each other during three minutes, using a chat box, before the sender chooses his message.
Finally, in the Snitch treatment, when the sender lies (and only then), the observer can send a message to the receiver that the sender lied to her. We used the strategy method, asking the observer whether to denounce a lie or not before seeing the sender's message. Observers can only reveal lies, and not send false messages themselves. Receivers therefore know that the observer's message is credible. Note that the total group payoff is always 26, so that possible treatment differences cannot be driven by efficiency considerations.
In all treatments, the procedures (but not the payoffs or messages) were made common knowledge. We elicited the senders' and observers' beliefs about the proportion of receivers who would follow the message. Beliefs were elicited after the sender sent the message and before the observer observed it. The belief elicitation was not incentivized to avoid the risk of hedging. At the end of the session, we elicited both risk attitudes using a procedure inspired by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2012) and the subjects' Machiavellianism score from the MACH-IV test of Christie and Geis (1970) . 1 1 For the risk task, each subject was endowed with 100 tokens (€2) and had to decide how many of these tokens
Procedures
We conducted 29 sessions at the GATE (Groupe d 'Analyse et de Théorie Economique) research institute in Lyon, France. The participants were 570 undergraduate students mostly from local engineering and business schools, recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Each session had between 12 and 30 participants. Table 1 indicates the characteristics of each treatment. The experiment was computered using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a terminal and role. Roles were denoted by "A", "B", and "C". Subjects in the role of senders (A) and observers (B) were located in the same room, with all observers seated in the same row and all senders seated in another row (not common knowledge, except in the Exposure treatments). Subjects in the role of receivers (C) were located in an adjacent room, connected through an open door. The instructions were role-specific and not read aloud (see Online Appendix 1 and 2). After answering questions in private, and stressing that the game would only be played once, the experimenters left the room, except for the programmer who sat behind a computer terminal in the room of players C.
It was made common information at the beginning of the experiment that a secretary who was not aware of the content of the experiment would pay participants in cash and in to invest in a risky asset, keeping for himself the amount that is not invested. The investment has a 50 percent probability to be a success. In case of a success, the investment returns 2.5 times the amount invested, and in case of a failure the amount invested is lost. The amount invested is a measures of risk aversion. The responses to the 20 questions of the MACH-IV test generate the Machiavellianism score, which includes some questions about moral attitudes. A higher score indicates people are more tolerant towards lying as a means to an end.
private. Sessions lasted approximately 40 minutes. Average earnings were €11.30 (S.D.=5.13), including the earnings from the risk elicitation task.
Behavioral conjectures
Senders choose between a truthful and false message. The receiver's response determines which of the options is implemented. When senders believe that their message will not be followed, lying becomes unattractive. In that case, senders may try to deceive receivers by telling the truth (see Sutter, 2009 ).
Formally, let ! and ! denote the sender's high and low payoff. The number of available options is , where one of the options yields ! and the other − 1 options yield
When the sender sends a truthful message, or when the observer does not reveal a lie in the Snitch treatment, senders believe that their message is followed with probability . In the Snitch treatment, we suppose that senders believe that the observer will reveal a lie with probability , with = 0 by construction in all other treatments. If the observer reveals the lie, it is plausible to assume that the receiver will not follow the sender's message. It is straightforward to show that lying is payoff maximizing if:
Lying is more attractive when the receiver is more likely to trust the message and the observer is less likely to reveal a lie. Lying is also more attractive when the number of available options increases. The reason is that only one of the options gives the high payoff to the sender, and if there are many possible options then this particular option is unlikely to be implemented after a truthful message even if the receiver does not trust the message.
We distinguish advantageous lies and disadvantageous lies. Lies are advantageous if it is payoff maximizing (in monetary terms) for senders to lie, i.e., the sender's beliefs are such that (1) holds 2 . Otherwise, lies are disadvantageous. When we refer to the overall lying rate, we include both types of lies.
We now formulate our hypotheses. Note that any treatment differences can be caused by either (i) a change in the willingness to lie conditional on beliefs (not) satisfying (1), (ii) a change in the proportion of participants with beliefs satisfying (1).
First, we conjecture that the vast majority of senders prefer the allocation (15, 7, 4) to the allocation (5, 6, 15) . Given the earlier findings that many people are averse to lying, however, we also expect to see a substantial number of honest messages in the baseline, even if senders expect that their message will be followed and lying is to their advantage. (1) holds with equality. However, our empiricial findings are largely unaffected if we exclude participants for whom this is the case. Note also that the reported beliefs may be biased, which would affect our classification. In particular, beliefs may be self-serving: people may report low beliefs to justify lying. However, observers have no reason to bias their beliefs, and on average senders' beliefs are similar to observers' beliefs in most treatments (see Table 2 ). The exception is the Baseline, where senders' beliefs are significantly lower than observers' beliefs (two-tailed t-test, p=0.030 In the Snitch treatment, observers can tell on senders by revealing the lie to the receiver at a small cost to themselves (they sacrifice €1). Thus, potentially a lie is now observed by both the observer as well as the receiver. This makes lying less attractive for senders who dislike being exposed as dishonest, especially since receivers learn that senders tried to mislead them. Although selfish observers should never denounce, Reuben and Stephenson (2013) have shown that a number of individuals are willing to report the lies of others only when groups cannot select their members, like in our experiment. 4 Note also that lying becomes less attractive because the message is less likely to be followed (see (1)). The proportion of senders for whom lying is advantageous decreases, which reduces the overall lying rate. There is a possible countereffect to this "snitch effect". Not getting a message from the observer makes the sender's message more credible to the receiver. This makes lying more attractive. For the same reason as above, we do not expect receivers to change their behavior substantially, and thus expect that this "credibility effect" is dominated. In the empirical analysis, we control for changes in beliefs and empirically determine the net effect. In the Exposure treatment, contrary to conjecture C2, we do not find a decrease in the lying rate. This is true for advantageous as well as disadvantageous lies.
Results
In the Chat treatment, we again find a very similar lying rate compared to the Baseline treatment. The chats do not make senders more pessimistic: average beliefs by senders that their message will be followed are almost the same. Observers, on the other hand, become significantly more pessimistic, lowering their beliefs on average from 59.74 to 46.19 (t-test, p=0.017, N=62) . 5 Observers have more optimistic beliefs than senders in the Baseline, but end up with the same average beliefs in the Chat treatment. Moreover, the beliefs of senders and observers become highly correlated (Pearson's correlation coefficient 0.498, p = 0.004, N = 31), indicating that they discuss their expectations about the receiver's behavior.
If the senders' beliefs and the lying rates are similar across the two treatments, one may suspect that observers did not express much disapproval towards lying. Indeed, upon inspection of the chats, we did not encounter a single conversation in which moral aspects were mentioned, although moral hypocrisy can be detected in one conversation. Turning to the Snitch treatment, we observe that in contrast to conjecture C4, the lying rate is somewhat higher than in the Baseline treatment, although the difference of about 13
percentage points is not significant (proportion test, p=0.393). We pointed out before that a higher lying rate is possible if the credibility effect dominates. We find little evidence of this, however. The proportion of people who believe that lying is advantageous (35 percent) is below that in the Baseline (52 percent). There is a remarkable difference with the Baseline, though. Of participants who believe that lying is disadvantageous, 55 percent lie, more than double the percentage of the Baseline (proportion test, p=0.094, N=35). Possibly, senders prefer to delegate the decision to the observer, to share responsibility. If they would send a truthful message, the observers cannot take any action.
An econometric analysis confirms these findings. Table A1 in the Online Appendix reports estimates from a linear probability model. Without any further controls, none of the treatments increases the lying rate significantly compared to the Baseline treatment (column 6 "S(ender): We can either play honest and propose Y, or propose X and the two of us earn more but he will not know. O(observer): By proposing Y, he will perhaps believe that we are lying and choose the other option, which is all benefit for you. That's it. S: Yes, it is what I think. It is very likely that he will choose the other option. O: And then, at least we will have been honest! S: Thus, one can say Y in order to have good conscience while hoping that he will do the opposite! O: Exactly! S: Fine. Then, I'll send him Y." 7 We also encountered third-level reasoning: "S(ender): We tell the truth and we bet on the fact that she will do the opposite, by choosing message 2. O(bserver): Yes, I think that she will not trust. I agree to tell the truth. S: OK, but if she is ahead of us and thus if she does what we say….we'll be screwed up. O: Yes there is always a risk. But I think it is less likely between the two possibilities." 1). When we split the sample by disadvantageous versus advantageous lies (columns 2 and 3) the lying rate is significantly higher in the Snitch treatment for senders who believe that lying is disadvantageous. Controlling for individual characteristics, including gender, age, risk attitude and Machiavellian score, does not affect the estimates (columns 4 and 5).
Result 2: Conjectures C2 to C4 are not supported by the data. The lying rate is not lower in the Exposure treatment than in the Baseline. The possibility to chat does not decrease the beliefs about the receivers' trust in the message. Finally the risk of being denounced does not make senders more reluctant to lie; a majority of senders who believe that their message will not be followed are lying as if to delegate the responsibility to the observer.
III. EXPERIMENT 2
The deception game of Experiment 1 has attractive features, but a disadvantage is that participants may engage in strategic truth telling in order to mislead receivers. Such choices ("strategic truths") cannot be classified as lies. They emanate from the group of participants who believe that lying is disadvantageous to themselves. However, in this group there are also participants that do not wish to deceive receivers per se, but are averse to lying.
To account for this, we ran two additional treatments of the exposure treatment using a design inspired by Erat and Gneezy (2012) . The Exposure_10 treatment is like the Exposure treatment, except that the number of options and messages is ten instead of two. In only one of those ten options, the sender earns the high payoff; the nine other options give the sender the low payoff. This largely eliminates incentives for strategic truth telling. Even if senders expect receivers not to follow the message, telling the truth is unlikely to result in the sender's preferred option. In Exposure_10_Conflict, we introduced a conflict of interest between the sender and the observer. It is similar to the Exposure_10 treatment, except that the possible payoff vectors are (15, 7, 4) and (5, 15, 6) . Note that the total earnings are still 26 in both cases. Wiltermuth (2011) and Gino et al. (2013) have shown that the mere presence of a thirdparty who benefits from a dishonest behavior allows individuals to self-justify unethical behavior that increases their own payoff. This justification disappears when their payoffs are misaligned. Our conjecture is that the misalignment of payoffs between the sender and the two other players reduces lying behavior. Table 3 reports the lying rates for those two treatments. We focus on participants who believe that lying is advantageous, which is the vast majority of participants. In Exposure_10, the lying rate for this group is 83, more than 20 percentage points higher than in the Baseline. 8 Thus, even when there can be little doubt about their intentions, senders are still very willing to lie when they can be identified. Strikingly, even in Exposure_10_conflict, where the payoffs are misaligned, the lying rate is not reduced. The difference in payoffs between lying successfully and reporting the truth is so large that the temptation of increasing one's payoff apparently exceeds the moral cost of dishonesty, even when dishonesty is publicly exposed. Note: Statistical tests compare treatments to Exposure_10. ** indicates significance at the 0.5 level in twotailed proportion tests (for truth, lies, and following decisions) or Mann-Whitney tests (for mean beliefs).
Result 3. When strategic truths are ruled out by design, the temptation of an advantageous lie is stronger than the moral cost associated with the public display of dishonesty even in front of one's potential victim and independent on whether or not there is a conflict of interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
We find that scrutinity has little effect on dishonest behavior. Being identified by another person does not reduce lying, even when lying is unambiguously advantageous and even when there is a conflict of interest with the observer. Our participants seem to feel neither shame nor guilt when lying. Our findings imply that a transparency policy is not sufficient to deter lying. This suggests exploring other policies, like the punishment of dishonesty or rewarding honesty. For example in a three-player game similar to ours, Xiao (2013) has shown that punishment of the sender by the observer can reduce lying behavior but only when the punisher cannot profit himself from the punishment. Of course, several extensions can be thought of. In particular, it would be interesting to vary the payoff distribution to introduce more equal distributions either in case of honesty or in case of dishonesty.
Online Appendix 1. Instructions for the two-option treatments (translated from French)
These are the instructions for all the two-option treatments. The parts of the instructions that are specific to the Chat, Snitch and Exposure_2 treatments are indicated in brackets.
A) Instructions for the senders
Thank you for participating in this short experimental session on decision-making. This session consists of two completely independent parts. We have distributed the instructions for the first part. You will receive the instructions for the last part later.
You will be paid individually in cash in a separate room by someone who is not aware of the content of the experiment.
For the duration of the experiment, your decisions are anonymous; you will never enter your name into the computer. Please remain silent throughout the experiment. These instructions are for your own use only.
Part 1
You are called "person A" and you will be randomly matched with two other people who participate in this session, called "person B" and "person C."
None of you will ever know the identity of the other two participants.
[ Two possible payment options are available to you and your co-participants in this part. The two payment options are:
€ 5 for you, 6 € for person B and 15 € for person C or: € 15 for you, 7 € for person B and 4 € for person C.
At the beginning of this part, you and person B (but not person C) learn which distribution is called "option X" and which is called "option Y."
Person C must choose between option X and option Y to determine which option will be implemented. The only information that person C possesses is the information that you send him in a message [Snitch treatment: and possibly the information that person B sends to him]. In other words, person C will never know the monetary payoffs associated with each option, nor the differences between the earnings. Person C will never be informed about which option is best for each of the three persons.
We will ask you to choose one of the two following messages to send to person C: Message 1: "Option X earns you more money than option Y." Message 2: "Option Y earns you more money than option X."
We will send your message to person C and ask him to choose between option X and option Y. The choice of person C will determine the earnings of the three persons. However, person C will never know the amounts that were offered in the option that was not selected (that is to say, he will never know if your message was true or not). 9 In addition, person C will never know the amounts that you and person B earn depending on the different options.
Person B receives the same information as you do: B is informed about the payoffs associated with each option, X and Y, and knows the two messages that you can send to person C. At the end of the session, you, person B and person C will only be informed about one's own payoff. In the second part, you will no longer be matched with any participant.
Please, read these instructions again. If you have any question, raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private.
Part 2
[The instructions for Part 2 were displayed on the subjects' screen after completion of part 1.]
Description of the task You receive 100 tokens (with 100 tokens= €2). We ask you to choose the number of tokens (between 0 and 100, 0 and 100 included) that you are willing to invest in a risky investment. You keep the tokens that you do not invest.
The investment
The investment is successful with chance one out of two. If it is a success, you receive 2.5 times the number of tokens you have invested. If the investment is not a success, you lose the tokens you have invested. Example 1. You invest 0 tokens. You earn (100-0)=100. Example 2. You invest 50 tokens. If the investment is a success, you earn: (100 -50) + 2.5*50= 175. If the investment is not a success, you earn: (100-50) + 0 = 50. Example 3. You invest 100 tokens. If the investment is a success, you earn: (100 -100) + 2.5*100= 250. If the investment is not a success, you earn: (100-100) + 0 = 0.
How do we determine if your investment is a success?
We ask you to choose a color among the two following colors: red and black. Then, click the button "random draw". Each color has a chance of one out of two to be randomly drawn by the computer program. If the randomly drawn color is the color that you have selected, the investment is a success. If the randomly drawn color is not the color you have selected, the investment is not a success.
To sum up: you choose the number of tokens to invest, then you choose the color. Then you click the button for the random draw.
Your earnings will be added to your previous earnings.
---------------
B) Instructions for the observers
Part 1
You are called "person B" and you will be randomly matched with two other people who participate in this session, called "person A" and "person C."
[In the Exposure_2 treatment, the previous sentence was replaced with the following paragraph: Persons A and C with whom you are matched will never know your identity. You will never know the identity of person C. In contrast, you will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched in the room. Indeed, at the beginning of this part before decisions are made, we will ask each person A to stand up, one by one. We will call each person A by the number on his tag and person A will have to stand up. You know the number of the tag of the person A with whom you have been matched: it is the number indicated on the tag we gave you (for example, if you have received the tag with number 1, it means that you are matched with person A number 1). Thus, you will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched. In contrast, person A will not be able to identify you. We ask you not to make any sign that would allow person A to identify you in the room. Person C knows that you can identify person A and that person A cannot identify you.]
Two possible payment options are available to you and your co-participants in this part. The two payment options are:
€ 5 for person A, 6 € for you and 15 € for person C or: € 15 for person A, 7 € for you and 4 € for person C.
At the beginning of this part, you and person A (but not person C) learn which distribution is called "option X" and which is called "option Y." Person C must choose between option X and option Y to determine which option will be implemented. The only information person C possesses is the information that person A sends him in a message [Snitch treatment: and possibly the information that you send to him]. Person C will never know the monetary payoffs associated with each option, nor the differences between the earnings. Person C will never be informed about which option is best for each of the three persons.
We will ask person A to choose one of the two following messages to send to person C: Message 1: "Option X earns you more money than option Y." Message 2: "Option Y earns you more money than option X."
We will send the message by person A to person C and ask him to choose between option X and option Y. The choice of person C will determine the earnings of the three persons. However, person C will never know the amounts that were offered in the option that was not selected (that is to say, he will never know if the message of person A was true or not). 12 In addition, person C will never know the amounts that you and person A earn depending on the different options. You are informed about the message that person A decided to send to person C. You have no decision to make.
[Chat treatment only: Before person A makes his decision about the message to send to person C, you have the opportunity to interact with person A using a chat box that appears on your screen. The only restriction regarding your interaction with person A is that it is forbidden to identify yourself or to ask person
13
Both person A and person C know that: you know the payoffs associated with each option, the two possible messages sent by A, the message chosen by A; you do not make a decision. At the end of the session, you, person A and person C will only be informed about one's own payoff. In the second part, you will no longer be matched with any participant.
Please, read these instructions again. If you have any question, raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. 
C) Instructions for the receivers
Part 1
You are called "person C" and you will be randomly matched with two other people who participate in this session, called "person A" and "person B."
You will never know the identity of the other two participants and the other participants will never know your identity.
[In the Exposure_2 treatment: In contrast, the person B with whom you are matched will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched in the room. Indeed, at the beginning of this part before decisions are made, we will ask each person A to stand up, one by one. We will call each person A by the number on his tag and person A will have to stand up (for example, if person A has received the tag with number 1, it means that this person is person A number 1). The person B with whom you are matched knows the number of the tag of person A and thus this person will be able to identify person A in the room. In contrast, person A will not be able to identify person B with whom you are matched. We asked person B not to make any sign that would allow person A to identify him in the room. ]
Two possible payment options, called "option X" and "option Y", are available to you and your co-participants. Each option specifies a payoff for person A, a payoff for person B and a payoff for person C (you).
Payoffs depend on the payment option that you will select, X or Y. We have shown the two payment options to person A and to person B. The only information that you have available to make your choice is the message sent to you by person A.
The two possible messages are the following: Message 1: "Option X earns you more money than option Y." Message 2: "Option Y earns you more money than option X."
You will be informed about the message sent to you by person A. Then, we will ask you to choose between option X and option Y. Your choice will determine the earnings of the three persons. You will never know the amounts that were offered in the option that you did not select (that is to say, you will never know if the message of person A was true or not). 15 In addition, you will never know the amounts that person A and person B earn depending on the different options.
Person B receives the same information as person A: B is informed of the payoffs associated with each option, X and Y, and knows the two possible messages person A can send to you. Person B can observe the message A has chosen to send to you and person A knows this. Person B makes no decision. 
-If person A's message is not true, person B's message will be sent to you only if person B has decided to send you a message. -If person A's message is true, person B cannot send a message to you. Person B will then be informed of the message that person A actually chose to send to you. But person A will not know whether person B has decided to send a message to you if his message is not true. If you receive a message from person B, it means that the message of person A is not true. If you do not receive a message from person B, you do not know whether this is because person A's message is true or because person B has decided not to send you a message.]
The following table summarizes All decisions are taken only once.
At the end of the session, you, person A and person B will only be informed about one's own payoff.
In the second part, you will no longer be matched with any participant.
The instructions are for the two ten-option treatments. The parts of the instructions that are specific to the Exposure_10_Conflict treatment are indicated into backets in italics.
A) Instructions for the senders
Part 1
You will never know the identity of the other two participants. Person C with whom you are matched will never know your identity or that of person B. In contrast, person B with whom you are matched will be able to identify you in the room. Indeed, at the beginning of this part before you make your decision, we will ask each person A to stand up, one by one. We will call you by the number on your tag and you will have to stand up (for example, if you have received the tag with number 1, it means that you are person A number 1). Person B with whom you are matched knows the number of your tag, so that this person will be able to identify you in the room. In contrast, you will not be able to identify the person B you are matched with. We asked person B not to make any sign that would allow you to identify him in the room. Person C knows that person B has identified you and that you cannot identify person B.
Ten possible payment options (numbered from 1 to 10) are available to you and your co-participants in this part. Before the beginning of the experiment, the computer program has randomly selected one number between 1 and 10. This number is the number of the option that pays the following amounts: At the beginning of this part, you and person B (but not person C) learn which number has been randomly drawn.
Person C must choose between the ten options to determine which option will be implemented. The only information that person C possesses is the information that you send him in a message. Person C will never know the monetary payoffs associated with each option, nor the differences in earnings. Person C will never be informed of which option is best for each of the three persons.
We will ask you to choose one of the ten following messages you send to person C: Message 1: "Option 1 earns you more money than the other options." Message 2: "Option 2 earns you more money than the other options." Message 3: "Option 3 earns you more money than the other options."
Message 4: "Option 4 earns you more money than the other options." Message 5: "Option 5 earns you more money than the other options." Message 6: "Option 6 earns you more money than the other options." Message 7: "Option 7 earns you more money than the other options." Message 8: "Option 8 earns you more money than the other options." Message 9: "Option 9 earns you more money than the other options." Message 10: "Option 10 earns you more money than the other options."
We will forward your message to person C and ask him to choose between the ten options. The choice of person C will determine the earnings of the three persons. However, person C will never know the amounts that were offered in the options that were not selected (that is to say, he will never know if your message was true or not).
In addition, person C will never know the amounts that you and person B earn depending on the different options.
Person B receives the same information as you: B is informed of the payoffs associated with each option, and knows the ten messages that you can send to person C. Person B is informed of the message you send to person C but he cannot send any message himself to person C. Person B makes no decision. Both person B and person C know that you know the payoffs associated with each option.
The following table summarizes At the end of the session, you, person B and person C will only be informed about one's own payoff. In the second part, you will no longer be matched with any participant.
-------------B) Instructions for the observers
Part 1
The persons A and C with whom you are matched will never know your identity. You will never know the identity of person C. In contrast, you will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched in the room. Indeed, at the beginning of this part before decisions are made, we will ask each person A to stand up, one by one. We will call each person A by the number on his tag and person A will have to stand up. You know the number of the tag of the person A with whom you have been matched: it is the number indicated on the tag we gave you (for example, if you have received the tag with number 1, it means that you are matched with person A number 1). Thus, you will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched. In contrast, person A will not be able to identify you. We ask you not to make any sign that would allow person A to identify you in the room. Person C knows that you can identify person A and that person A cannot identify you.
Ten possible payment options (numbered from 1 to 10) are available to you and your co-participants in this part. Before the beginning of the experiment, the computer program has randomly selected one number between 1 and 10. This number is the number of the option that pays the following amounts: At the beginning of this part, you and person A (but not person C) learn which number has been randomly drawn.
Person C must choose between the ten options to determine which option will be implemented. The only information that person C possesses is the information that person A send him in a message. Person C will never know the monetary payoffs associated with each option, nor the earnings gap. Person C will never be informed about which option is best for each of the three persons.
We will ask person A to choose one of the ten following messages to send to person C:
We will forward the message of person A to person C and ask him to choose between the ten options. The choice of person C will determine the earnings of the three persons. However, person C will never know the amounts that were offered in the options that were not selected (that is to say, he will never know if the message of person A was true or not). In addition, person C will never know the amounts that you and person A earn depending on the different options.
You are informed of the message that person A sends to person C. You have no decision to make. Both person A and person C know that: you know the payoffs associated with each option, the ten possible messages that can be sent by A, the message chosen by A; you do not make a decision. At the end of the session, you, person A and person C will only be informed about one's own payoff. In the second part, you will no longer be matched with any participant.
Part 2
[The instructions for Part 2 are similar to those of the senders.] ----------------C) Instructions for the receivers
Part 1
In contrast, the person B with whom you are matched will be able to identify the person A with whom you are matched in the room. Indeed, at the beginning of this part before decisions are made, we will ask each person A to stand up, one by one. We will call each person A by the number on his tag and person A will have to stand up (for example, if person A has received the tag with number 1, it means that this person is person A number 1). The person B with whom you are matched knows the number of the tag of person A and thus this person will be able to identify person A in the room. In contrast, person A will not be able to identify person B with whom you are matched. We asked person B not to make any sign that would allow person A to identify him in the room.
Ten possible payment options (numbered from 1 to 10) are available for you and your co-participants in this part. Each option specifies a payoff for person A, a payoff for person B and a payoff for person C (you).
Payoffs depend on the payment option that you will select, X or Y. We have shown the ten payment options to person A and to person B. The only information that you have to make your choice is the message sent to you by person A.
The ten possible messages are the following:
Message 1: "Option 1 earns you more money than the other options." Message 2: "Option 2 earns you more money than the other options." Message 3: "Option 3 earns you more money than the other options." Message 4: "Option 4 earns you more money than the other options." Message 5: "Option 5 earns you more money than the other options." Message 6: "Option 6 earns you more money than the other options." Message 7: "Option 7 earns you more money than the other options." Message 8: "Option 8 earns you more money than the other options." Message 9: "Option 9 earns you more money than the other options." Message 10: "Option 10 earns you more money than the other options."
You will be informed of the message sent to you by person A. Then, we will ask you to choose between the ten options by choosing a number between 1 and 10. Your choice will determine the earnings of the three persons. You will never know the amounts that were offered in the options that you did not select (that is to say, you will never know if the message of person A was true or not). In addition, you will never know the amounts that person A and person B earn depending on the different options. Note: you know neither the payoffs at stake, nor the payoffs associated with each option, nor which option is the best for each of the three persons All decisions are taken only once.
